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CASES NOTED
different from Welsh's: But the criteria: established. in this case might
prove helpful, or even decisive in a later determination by other courts.24
It is this author's opinion that the Commissoner will not acquiesce,'
nor will he allow a flood of deductions from other. working degree can-
didates. If it is not overruled, however, the case may lead to an
eventual request for certiorari, and ultimately a conclusive determi-
nation by the Supreme Court of the United States. Or it might prompt
Congress to take further action to codify a clear and unambiguous con-
struction of the deductibility of expenses leading to a degree, especially
a degree that is useful in as many professions as a law degree.
CHARLES L. RUFFNER
PERSONAL PROPERTY-EXTENT OF DOWER IN A STOCK
MARGIN ACCOUNT
The decedent maintained with his broker a stock margin account,
against which he owed 84,140 dollars. The Florida statute1 provides
that a widow is entitled to dower in personal property owned by her
husband at the time of his death. In this action by the widow against
the personal representative of her husband's estate,2 the, trial -court
found that the widow was entitled to dower in only the net value of the
account, i.e., the value of the securities less the margin obligation. On
appeal, held, reversed: stock purchased through a broker is owned by
the purchaser and the indebtedness -to the broker is not a limitation on
this ownership. The widow is entitled to dower .as measured by the full
value of the securities in the margin account at the time of her husband's
death. Rubin v. Rubin's Estate, 144 So.2d 527 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).3
Florida has extended common-law dower by statute4 to allow the
widow a "one-third part absolutely" of the personal property "owned"
24. There is no indication that the Tax Court proposes to alter in any way its con-
sistently negative position. See note 2 supra.
25. The practical effect of a non-acquiescence is that the Commissioner will propose to
disallow all similar deductions and make the deducting taxpayer defend his position in
court.
1. FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1961). The widow is entitled to "one-third part absolutely
of the personal property owned by her husband at the time of his death, and in all cases
the widow's dower shall be free from liability for all debts of the decedent . .. .
2. The interest of the broker is not- in question since the dower interest would not
infringe upon the amount due the broker. See note 29 infra and accompanying text.
3. The same court subsequently decided Smith v. Estate of Marmer, 144 So.2d 870
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), on the basis of this case. The court rejected the additional argu-
ment that the debt was in the nature of a purchase money mortgage on the stock.
Id. at 871.
4. FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1961); 11 FLA. JuR., Dower § 9 (1957).
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by her husband at the time of his death.' Stock in a corporation is per-
sonalty which is subject to dower in Florida.'
It was formerly held that dower rights in personalty were not affected
by the fact that the owner did not have the property in his possession,
as long as he was the owner at the time of his death.7 But when Hender-
son v. Usher' was decided in 1936, the statute allowed dower in property
of which the husband died "possessed."9 In Henderson the court had to
determine whether stock held by the broker in a margin account was pos-
sessed by the deceased husband. The court decided:
Inasmuch as the husband could not, under the contract, have
had full title to or have taken the securities out of the pos-
session of the broker without paying the amount due on them
under the contract of purchase, it cannot be said that the de-
cedent was in possession, at the time of his death, of more than
his ultimate rights in the brokerage account .... Consequently
the widow is entitled to dower only in the rights held by her
husband, at the time of his death, in such brokerage account. °
However, it is evident that a divergent result could be obtained under
the present dower statute because of the statutory change in wording
from "possessed" to "owned."
11
In In Re Payne's Estate" the Supreme Court held that a widow
was entitled to dower in the entire purchase money indebtedness due
her husband from the sale of his interest in a partnership. Charges or
offsets due the purchaser from the decedent were not allowed in com-
puting the dower rights of the widow. The court discussed the Hender-
son 13 case but said that:
The same principles cannot be applied to the instant case
because of the language of the present exemption statute and
the nature of the property here involved.' 4
5. FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1961). A previous Florida statute gave dower in personal
property of which the husband died "possessed." See note 8 infra.
6. Henderson v.-Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936).
7. Woodberry v. Matherson, 19 Fla. 778 (1883).
8. 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936). This case presents the crux of the problem in
applying dower to a stock margin account since it was the first and only controlling case
law of the Florida Supreme Court.
9. 3 SKILLMAN, COMPILED GENERAL LAWS OF FLORIDA 1927 § 5503 (1928). This
statute has since been changed to give dower to the widow in property which the husband
"owned" at the time of his death. See note 1 supra. The significance of such a semantic
distinction is exemplified by the result, contrary to Henderson, achieved in the instant
case under a similar factual situation.
10. Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 728, 170 So. 846, 853 (1936).
11. See note 9 supra.
12. 83 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1955). This case can be factually distinguished from the instant
case and Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936), since it did not involve
a stock margin account.
13. Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936).
14. In Re Payne's Estate, 83 So.2d 109, 111 (Fla. 1955). The change in language
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The decision in the Rubin case relied on this pronouncement as con-
trolling authority for the proposition that Henderson v. Usher"5 no longer
applies. But the factual situation in Payne was not the same as that
found in the Henderson 'and Rubin cases, thus rendering this reliance-
vulnerable to attack.
Having decided that the legislature meant to change the law by
substituting the word "owned" for "possessed," the court in the instant
case then concluded that the stock itself, not the margin account, was
owned.16 The debt due the broker was said not to constitute a limitation
on the ownership of the stock, but to be a debt to a third person.
Associate Judge Paul D. Barns dissented, relegating the statements
concerning the Henderson case in In Re Payne's Estate to dictum. He
cited Henderson as authority for the proposition that dower extends to
the right of redemption of the pledged 17 securities from the broker and
not to the securities 'themselves.' Under this view the statutory change
from "possessed" to "owned" would be of no consequence since the right
to redeem was owned as well as possessed.
The position taken by the Rubin dissent seems consistent with the
general statement that "a wife's dower interest cannot be greater than
the interest of her deceased husband in any particular property."' 9
More specific authority was expounded by the Supreme Court in its
statement in Henderson that:
When decedent bought the stocks and securities "on margin,"
his property rights therein and thereto were expressly made, by
the purchase agreement, subject to the right of the broker to
hold the stocks and securities until all amounts due the broker
by the customer under the contract had been paid in full. The
widow takes dower in such rights in and to the stocks and
securities as her deceased husband had at the time of his death,
which was the right to possess the stocks and securities or the
value thereof remaining after all claims of the broker under
the contract had been fully satisfied out of the stocks and
securities or their value. 
20
referred to is the change from "possessed" to "owned." Dowling, Dower in Elorida, 31 FLA.
B.J. 345, 351 (1957). See note 9 supra.
15. 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936).
16. Rubin v. Rubin's Estate, 144 So.2d 527, 529 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). The distinction
between ownership of the stock itself, as opposed to ownership of the account which
encompasses the stock and the indebtedness, is the basis of the dissenting opinion. These
ramifications are critical since ownership of the account alone furnishes a basis for dower
only in the net proceeds.
17. The relationship between purchaser and broker is that of a pledge although the
relationship at times is characterized as principal and agent, debtor and creditor and
trustee or fiduciary. Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936).
18. See note 16 supra.
19. La Mar v. Lechlider, 135 Fla. 703, 185 So. 833 (1939); 11 FLA. JUa., Dower § 7
(1957).
20. Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 727, 170 So. 846, 853 (1936); see also Markham
v. Jaudon, 41 N.Y. 235 (1869).
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* The pledged stock is not, part of the pledgor's estate until the
secured debts are paid. Until then the pledgee is entitled to hold the
stock as against the pledgor's executor or administrator and as against
the claim of the pledgor's widow for a year's allowance in lieu of home-
stead.2 The widow has no right to require the executor to pay the
amount due on the purchase price of the stock.2 Can it be said that
this property was owned to any greater extent than it was possessed in
the Henderson case?
The' distinction between owned and possessed relied upon by the
majority opinion is, at best, a semantic distinction which could be argued
from various points of view.23 The Florida Supreme Court has looked
to the nature of the transaction in deciding whether the property was
possessed.24 The same approach should have been made in deciding
whether it was owned. According to the intent and purpose of the trans-
action, the broker does not contemplate that the customer will ever re-
ceive the stock or own it.25 The transaction is an executory agreement
for speculation in stock which the broker agrees to carry in his own
name, accounting to his customer for the profits and holding him respon-
sible for the loss.28
The contention of the dissenting opinion that the Henderson 7 case
decided that the stock margin account (not the stock therein) is the prop-
erty which had to be possessed, or owned under the present statute,28
in order for dower to attach, seems more plausible after examining the
reasoning in that case. This interpretation would not.deprive the statu-
tory change from possessed to owned of all meaning. For instance,
personal property which is bailed at the time of the husband's death is
property owned although not possessed.
The result of this decision is to change the nature of personal prop-
erty to which dower may attach. The widow's dower interest may now
attach to the full value of stock within a margin account, rather than to
the net value of the account. But the interest of the broker is not com-
promised since the court limits its decision to the statutory specification
that:
[N]othing herein contained shall be construed as impairing
the validity of the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or the
lien of any person in possession of personal property.
29
21. Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936).
22. Ibid. See also Hewitt v. Cox, 55 Ark. 225, 15 S.W. 1026 (1891).
23. The words "owned by" are defined as referring to an absolute and unqualified
title. BAcx, LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
24. Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936).
25. Id. at 725, 170 So. at 852; Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N.Y. 235, 256 (1869).
26. Henderson v. Usher, supra note 25.
27. Ibid..
28. FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1961).
29. FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1961).
CASES NOTED
Consequently, it is only the personal representative of the deceased
husband's estate who can claim loss; the share which he would receive
in his representative capacity has been substantially reduced by the
change in the law regarding the widow's interest.
The dower interest has been increased at the expense of the share
administered by the personal representative. This increase is equal to
one-third of the indebtedness on the stock. Dower did not attach to the
indebtedness when the basis used was the net value of the account.
The court's rationale for the resulting change in the law is subject
to criticism. But one reason, not mentioned by the court, may be a pre-
vailing factor in its liberal interpretation of the statutory change in
language. This is the court's zealous protection of dower rights. Dower
is a favored institution of the law,80 and public policy is summoned to
protect and extend it.
CARLOs P. LAMAR III
FAILURE TO TESTIFY-COMMENT BY CO-DEFENDANT
The appellant and a co-defendant were charged jointly with viola-
tion of the narcotic laws. Each defendant retained his own attorney. The
co-defendant's attorney, in arguing to the jury, contrasted his client's
willingness with the appellant's unwillingness to take the witness stand
and testify.' The appellant objected to the comments as being inflamma-
tory and prejudicial and moved for a mistrial. The motion was denied
and the jury found the appellant guilty and the co-defendant not guilty.
On appeal, held, reversed and remanded: When one of two defendants
jointly tried in a criminal proceeding in a federal court exercises his
right not to testify, the Fifth Amendment protects him from prejudicial
comments on his failure to testify made to the jury by an attorney for
the co-defendant. De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.
1962).
The roots of the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment
lie in English law during a very confusing period of legal history.2 The
first formal description of the procedure whereby a man on mere suspicion
30. Dowling, Dower In Florida, 31 FLA. B.J. 345 (1957). The courts in Florida have
long favored and protected the widow's right to dower.
1. The following is typical of the comments made by the co-defendant's counsel con-
cerning the failure of the appellant to testify: "Well, at least one man was honest enough
and had courage enough to take the stand and subject himself t6 cross examination, and
tell you the whole story .... You haven't heard a word, from this man [the.appellant]."
De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 142 (5th Cir. 1962).
2; Kemp, The Background oj the Fifth Amendment in English Law: A Study of its
Historical Implications, 1 W. & M. L. REv. 247 (1958); Wigmore, The Privilege Against
Self-Crimination: Its History, 15 HAav. L. REv. 610 (1902).
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